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1. Introduction  
 
Insurance-based investment products (IBIPs) constitute a vivid example of the intersection of 
different financial sectors within a distinct sectoral regulation entailing a life insurance element and 
an investment one. Contracts of insurance with a link to investment were developed since the 1960s-
1970s. More specifically, in the last decades, the pattern for European legislation has been to legislate 
for banks in the first instance and then to apply the same rules with minor modifications to investment 
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firms. Insurance regulation has followed a slightly different path in that there have been attempts to 
integrate insurance regulation with the regulation of banking and investment business at European 
level, and this was principally due to the fact of the different nature of underlying risks and business 
models involved.   
Directive 2016/97 on Insurance Distribution (IDD), defines IBIPs as insurance products offering 
a maturity value wholly or partially exposed, directly or indirectly, to market fluctuation, and not 
including non-life policies, life insurance policies which cover only death, incapacity due to injury, 
sickness or disability, pension products, occupational pensions schemes and individual pension 
products.1  
 
2. PRIIPs  - Evolution and Role 
 
The PRIIPs Regulation represents an innovative approach within the scope of the regulation 
of EU financial services, and applies cross-filed, for it covers multiple common featured products which 
may have different forms or routes but all have been created so as to provide investment 
opportunities to retail investors.2 The aim of the PRIIPs Regulation  is to encourage efficient EU 
markets by helping investors to better understand and compare the key features, risk, rewards and 
costs of different PRIIPs, through access to a short and consumer-friendly Key Information Document 
(KID).3  The PRIIPs Regulation applies to persons who manufacture PRIIPs, or advise on or sell PRIIPs. 
Hence, a PRIIP manufacturer (or any other person who changes an existing PRIIP, such as a distributor) 
is required to prepare a KID for each PRIIP that they produce and to publish each KID on their website. 
A person who advises a retail investor on a PRIIP or sells a PRIIP to a retail investor must provide the 
retail investor with a KID in good time before any transaction is concluded.  In addition to advisers, 
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this will impact intermediaries such as distributors. Where the retail investor initiates the transaction 
by means of distance communications, the KID may be provided after the conclusion of the transaction 
so long as it is not possible to provide the KID in advance and the retail investor consents. The retail 
investor must be told that it is not possible to provide the KID in advance, and that they can delay the 
transaction, to receive and read the KID before concluding the transaction.4 The KID includes all the 
information relevant for the investment decision of the individual retail investor in a concise way. The 
KID is an addition to the existing retail investor information obligations. The products covered by the 
new regulation include investment funds, structured products and structured deposits (packaged 
retail investment products), as well as life insurances with investment elements (insurance-based 
investment products), such as life insurances based on funds or index-linked life insurances. Taken 
together, these categories are referred to as PRIIPs, which the regulation is named after. However, 
certain types of life insurance, such as life insurance products where the benefits are only payable 
upon death or incapacity for work, are not within the scope of the regulation. This is also applicable 
for other insurance products, such as life insurances for which the redemption value is not exposed to 
market fluctuations. The regulator aims to establish a "level playing field" between providers of 
financial products and insurance products respectively, with regards to retail investor information 
standards. Generally, the KID must be provided to the investor before the PRIIP is purchased, or, 
before the investor has undertaken any obligation. An exception applies only when the investor 
initiates the transaction, concludes the transaction using a mean of long distance communication, the 
provision of a KID is not possible. In such a case, the investor has to be informed that the provision of 
a KID is not possible and that he has the option to delay the transaction in order to receive the KID 
before concluding the transaction and that the investor actively consents receiving the KID after the 
transaction. The harmonizing aim of the Regulation is apparent from the power granted to EIOPA to 
temporarily intervene in the promotion or sale of insurance-based investment products in the EU. This 
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is consistent with the powers granted to other ESAs under MiFID II in respect of specific non-insurance 
investments.5  
 
3. The IDD and its Impact on insurance and more specifically on IBIPs 
 
On 20 January, 2016, the Council of the European Union issued the IDD. Although aimed at 
minimum harmonization, the IDD fully recasts the IMD. The IDD will be implemented by all EU Member 
States by 23 February, 2018. Following the wave of other regulatory changes, such as MiFID II and 
PRIIPS Regulation, the IDD intends to strengthen consumer protection, improve the competitive 
landscape of the European insurance industry, and reduce cross-sectoral inconsistencies. However, 
the Directive is aimed at minimum harmonization and therefore does not preclude Member States 
from maintaining or introducing more stringent provisions, provided that these are consistent with 
the Directive. 6  
By introducing new defined terms such as insurance distribution' and 'insurance distributor, 
the IDD significantly extends the scope of application as compared to that of the IMD. Some of the 
IDD provisions place obligations on insurance distributors only, whilst others make reference to 
consumers or customer. There is no general definition of consumer or customer in the final text of 
IDD but it is clear from the use of the terms that they cover retail customers. The term professional 
client is used in the IDD but only in Recital 51 and Article 22(1). It is defined, by reference to Article 
4(1)(10) of MIFID II, to mean a client who possesses the experience, knowledge and expertise to make 
their own investment decisions and properly assess the risks they incur. The definition expressly 
includes pension funds and management companies of such funds. Recital 51 of the IDD confirms that, 
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updates/are-the-kids-alright/  
6 Clifford Chance, MiFID II & IDD: The impact on insurance based investment ("IBI") products, June 2016, 
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in some cases, where the customer is a professional client there is less need for the provision of 
information to enable a customer to make an informed choice. This expectation is confirmed in Article 
22(1) IDD which allows Member States to disapply the IDD information requirements where a 
customer is a professional client but only in respect of IBIPs. In addition to the IDD drafting points 
above, the FCA is afforded discretion to apply higher standards in some areas than under the IDD itself, 
so the ultimate impact on a business is subject to the FCA's approach to transposition of the IDD 
requirements.7  
The IDD requirements which are applicable to all insurance products can be summarised as 
follows:  a) Duty to act in customers' best interests: as per article 17 IDD, there exists a new general 
principle on insurance distributors to always act honestly, fairly and professionally in accordance with 
the best interests of their customers; b) Provision of general information: as per article 18 IDD,  in 
good time before the conclusion of an insurance contract, an insurance intermediary/ undertaking 
must disclose Its identity and address; the fact that it is an insurance intermediary or insurance 
undertaking, as appropriate; whether it provides advice about the insurance products sold; the 
procedures enabling customers and other interested parties to register complaints as referred to in 
article 14 IDD; the out-of-court complaint and redress procedures (article 15 IDD); c) Conflicts of 
interest and transparency: as per article 19 IDD, an– an insurance intermediary must provide 
customers in good time before the conclusion of an insurance contract with various types of 
information, including whether it has a direct or indirect holding representing 10% or more of the 
voting rights or capital in a given insurance undertaking; whether a given insurance undertaking or 
parent undertaking of a given insurance undertaking has a direct or indirect holding representing 10% 
or more of the voting rights or capital in the insurance intermediary; In relation to the contracts 
proposed or advised on, whether advice is given on the basis of a 'fair and personal analysis' or where 
there is a contractual obligation regarding exclusivity with one or more insurance undertakings (and, 
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if so, the names of the insurance undertakings must be provided); or if neither of the earlier conditions 
apply, then the insurance intermediary must provide the names of the insurance undertakings with 
which it may and does conduct business); the nature of the remuneration (i.e. a fee, commission or 
some other economic benefit in kind) received in relation to the insurance contract (but not amount); 
d) advised and non-advised sales standards: as per article 20 IDD there are various requirements in 
relation to sales, including whether it has a direct or indirect holding representing 10% or more of the 
voting rights or capital in a given insurance undertaking; whether a given insurance undertaking or 
parent undertaking of a given insurance undertaking has a direct or indirect holding representing 10% 
or more of the voting rights or capital in the insurance intermediary; in relation to the contracts 
proposed or advised on, whether advice is given on the basis of a fair and personal analysis or where 
there is a contractual obligation regarding exclusivity with one or more insurance undertakings (and, 
if so, the names of the insurance undertakings must be provided); or if neither of the earlier conditions 
apply, then the insurance intermediary must provide the names of the insurance undertakings with 
which it may and does conduct business); the nature of the remuneration (i.e. a fee, commission or 
some other economic benefit in kind) received in relation to the insurance contract (but not amount) 
e) advised and non-advised sales standards: as per article 20 IDD there are various requirements in 
relation to sales, such as the requirement that prior to the conclusion of an insurance contract, the 
insurance distributor must specify, on the basis of information obtained from the customer, the 
demands and the needs of that customer and provide objective information in a comprehensible form 
to allow that customer to make an informed decision on the product; the requirement that for non-
life insurance products, the product information must be provided in the form of an insurance product 
information document drawn up by the insurer, the details of which are specified in Article 20(7) and 
(8) IDD.8 
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Under the IDD, an IBIP is one which offers a maturity or surrender value and which has an 
'investment element' i.e. where that maturity or surrender value is wholly or partially exposed, directly 
or indirectly, to market fluctuations. This part of definition is the same as that used for IBIP in the 
PRIIPS Regulation, which requires a pre-contractual disclosure document (i.e. a KID) for certain 
products, including IBIPs. However, the IDD definition expressly excludes: (a) non-life insurance 
products as listed in Annex I to the Solvency II Directive 2009/138/EC (Classes of Non-life Insurance);  
life insurance contracts where the benefits under the contract are payable only on death or in respect 
of incapacity due to injury, sickness or disability; (c) pension products which, under national law, are 
recognised as having the primary purpose of providing the investor with an income in retirement, and 
which entitle the investor to certain benefits; (d) officially recognised occupational pension schemes 
falling under the scope of the Occupational Pension Funds Directive 2003/41/EC or Solvency II; and 
(e) individual pension products for which a financial contribution from the employer is required by 
national law and where the employer or the employee has no choice as to the pension product or 
provider. These exclusions result in a small selection of products, for example, unit-linked policies, 
with-profits policies and investment-linked income annuities (which are not considered pension 
products) that must comply with the IDD additional consumer protection requirements and, as 
confirmed by Recital 42 of the IDD, provide information in the form of a KID too.9 
Article 26 IDD makes clear that Chapter VI requirements which apply only to IBIPs are 
additional to the requirements set out in Article 17, 18, 19 and 20 (detailed in the box opposite) which 
apply to all products within scope of the IDD. Broadly, the additional IDD requirements on IBIPs are as 
follows: a) Article 27:– Prevention of conflicts of interest; b) Article 28: Conflicts of interest; c) Article 
29: Information to customers; d) Article 30: Assessment of suitability and appropriateness and 
reporting to customers.  
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Under Article 27 IDD, an insurance intermediary or an undertaking carrying on distribution of 
IBI products is expected to maintain and operate effective organisational and administrative 
arrangements with a view to taking all reasonable steps to prevent a conflict of interests, which as 
determined under Article 28 IDD, could adversely affect the interests of customers.  
The wording in Article 27 is purposefully vague because the IDD, like the IMD, is a minimum 
harmonisation instrument. This means that the details as to what 'effective organisational and 
administrative arrangements' are necessary will be determined by the national competent authorities. 
In the UK, the FCA is therefore expected to align IDD conflict requirements with those in its COBS and 
SYSC regime, both of which effectively stem from Principle 8 of the FCA's Principles for Business, which 
states that “a firm must manage conflicts of interest fairly, both between itself and its customers and 
between a customer and another client.” The FCA's course of action is subject to Article 28(3) IDD. 
This confers a power on the European Commission to adopt delegated acts, which will be directly 
effective and will: a) define the steps that insurance intermediaries and insurance undertakings might 
reasonably be expected to take to identify, prevent, manage and disclose conflicts of interest when 
carrying out insurance distribution activities; and b) establish appropriate criteria for determining the 
types of conflicts of interest whose existence may damage the interests of customers or potential 
customers.10  
It seems counter-intuitive for a minimum harmonisation directive to specify more detail 
through delegated acts but it will be interesting to see how detailed the provisions turn out to be. In 
any case, the FCA flagged in its Thematic Review TR14/9 “Commercial insurance intermediaries – 
conflicts of interest and intermediary remuneration” May 2014,11 that conflicts of interest and their 
management was an area of concern and that there would be more proactive engagement with the 
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intermediary industry to understand the application of current FCA rules. The FCA has identified this 
as an area which is ripe for change and so insurers and insurance intermediaries should take steps 
now to ensure that their own conflicts identification and management are not lacking In addition to 
Article 18 and 19 IDD information requirements, insurance intermediaries and undertakings must 
comply with Article 29 IDD requirements in relation to IBI products including the following, as a 
minimum, in good time before a contract is concluded: a) where advice is provided, whether a periodic 
assessment of the suitability of the IBI products recommended to that customer will also be provided; 
b) appropriate guidance on, and warnings of, the risks associated with the IBI products or in respect 
of particular investment strategies proposed; c) cost information relating to the distribution of the IBI 
product, including the cost of advice, where relevant, the cost of the IBI product recommended or 
marketed to the customer, and how the customer may pay for it. The IDD also requires that 
information about costs and charges that are not caused by the occurrence of underlying market risk 
must be in aggregate form to allow the customer to understand the overall cost, as well as the 
cumulative effect on the investment return. If the customer requests, an itemised breakdown of the 
costs and charges must be provided. The IDD, also under Article 29(3), allows Member States to 
impose stricter IBIP information requirements. Given that consumer protection is part of the FCA's 
strategic objective the FCA is expected to use this directive discretion to implement higher 
requirements, but the impact of these may be limited given that the UK has already gold plated the 
IMD and has banned commissions on investment products altogether under the Retail Distribution 
Review. However such raising of standards is subject to Article 29(4) IDD which allows the Commission 
to adopt delegated acts to specify the criteria for assessing whether inducements paid or received by 
an insurance intermediary or insurance undertaking have a detrimental impact on the quality of the 
relevant service to the customer and the compliance of insurance intermediaries and insurance 
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undertakings paying or receiving inducements with the obligation to act honestly, fairly and 
professionally in accordance with the customer's best interests.12  
Finally, article 30 IDD requires an insurance intermediary or insurance undertaking providing 
advice on an IBIP to conduct an assessment to ascertain the suitability and appropriateness of a 
product. This requirement is replicated from that imposed by on investment firms by Article 25 of 
MIFID II.13 Suitability assessment: this assessment, required under Article 30(1) IDD will need the 
following information to be acquired about the customer: a) knowledge and experience in the 
investment field relevant to the specific type of product or service; b) financial situation, including the 
ability to bear losses; c) investment objectives, including their risk tolerance. To ensure the above 
obligations are met, the information could be obtained by asking customers to fill out a questionnaire 
and to submit documents to evidence their financial position. A credit check and score could also 
demonstrated some of the above requirements. In any case, the suitability assessment should be 
documented. Additionally, a record of any documents which set out the rights and obligations of the 
parties must be retained. Suitability statement: under Article 30(5) IDD, insurance intermediaries or 
insurance undertakings must, before concluding the IBI product contract, provide the customer with 
a suitability statement on a durable medium which must specify the advice given and how it meets 
the customer's preferences, objectives and other characteristics. A durable medium is defined in 
Article 2 (18) as an instrument which: (a) enables a customer to store information addressed 
personally to that customer in a way accessible for future reference and for some time period 
adequate for the purposes of the information; and (b) allows the unchanged reproduction of the 
information stored. For example, a PDF copy of a document setting out a suitability statement for 
example would meet the above requirements. Where the contract is concluded using a means of 
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distance communication (via, for example, the telephone or by email exchange) that prevents prior 
delivery of the suitability statement, the insurance intermediary or insurance undertaking can provide 
the suitability statement on a durable medium immediately after the customer is bound by any 
contract. However, this can only be done if the following conditions are met, i.e. a) that the customer 
has consented to receiving the suitability statement without undue delay after the contract is 
concluded and b) that the insurance intermediary or insurance undertaking has given the customer 
the option of delaying the conclusion of the contract to receive the suitability statement in advance. 
The above requirements could be met by asking a customer to tick a box indicating consent if the 
exchange is via email, or by verbally recording consent if the discussion is conducted via the telephone.  
Appropriateness assessment: if no advice is given during the sale of an IBIP, the insurance intermediary 
or insurance undertaking must ask the customer or potential customer to provide information 
regarding that person's knowledge and experience in the investment field relevant to the specific type 
of product or service offered or demanded. If the customer does not provide the necessary 
information, then a warning should be given and recorded to confirm that the IBI product may not be 
appropriate.14  
 
4.  IDD, MiFID II and Further Technical Advice Sought  
 
From October 2014 to January 2015, EIOPA conducted a public consultation on Guidelines on 
the product oversight and governance arrangements by insurance undertakings.15 The paper 
contained provisions related to the manufacturers of insurance products in Chapter 1 and provisions 
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on insurance distributors, which have been added in Chapter 2. The EIOPA Guidelines,16 which were 
finalised in April 2016, provide high level expectations on IDD requirements and should be adhered to 
given they are designed to prevent mis-selling. However, the Guidelines will look very familiar to UK 
distributors and issuers.17   
In February 2016, EIOPA was asked with a formal “Request for Advice” by the European 
Commission to provide technical advice on possible delegated acts to further specify certain aspects 
of the IDD. In relation to non-complex insurance-based investment products the Commission sought 
EIOPA’s response as to the criteria to assess such products. Drawing from the relevant provisions in 
the IDD (articles 30(3) (a), 30(6)) and in MiFID II (article 57) although an assessment of the suitability 
or appropriateness of an IBIP for the customer by the insurance distributor is generally required as 
part of an advised or non- advised sale (IDD article 30 (1),(2)), Member States are allowed (IDD article 
30(3)) to derogate from these obligations and to not require either a suitability or appropriateness 
test to be conducted, where various conditions are satisfied. Such sales (“execution only”) although 
carried out only at the initiative of the customer still require the insurance distributor to specify the 
demands and needs of the customer prior to the conclusion of the contract (IDD article 20(1)). One of 
the conditions specified in Article 30(3) to determine whether an IBIP can be distributed as an 
execution-only sale relates to the complexity of the IBIP. IBIPs can be considered non-complex when 
they only provide investment exposure to the financial instruments deemed non-complex under 
MiFID II and do not incorporate a structure which makes it difficult for the customer to understand 
the risks involved (IDD article 30(3)(a)(i)). In accordance with Article 25(8) of MiFID II, the Commission 
is empowered to adopt delegated acts on the criteria identify “other non-complex financial 
instruments” referred to in Article 25(4)(a)(vi) of the same Directive. Also, Article 30(3)(a)(ii) of IDD 
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acknowledges the possibility that IBIP may not fall within the scope of Article 30(3)(a)(i), but may still 
be deemed a non-complex product. EIOPA considered that where an IBIP incorporates a structure 
which makes it difficult for the customer to understand the risks involved, it is in all cases not fit for 
distribution via an execution-only sale. EIOPA's evidence gathering has shown that there are only a 
limited number of IBIP types currently sold execution-only. Whilst numerous Member States allow for 
the sale of certain products on a non-advised basis, only a limited number allow for products to be 
sold by means of execution-only transactions. In relation to the criteria for the assessment of other 
non-complex financial instruments, as per the draft Commission Delegated Regulation under MiFID II, 
EIOPA has included the provisions in its technical advice where these criteria address product features, 
which are considered to be equally applicable to IBIPs.18 Regarding the nature of any guarantee 
provided by the insurance undertaking, where the latter provides a guarantee regarding the surrender 
and maturity value of an IBIP, the customer is not fully exposed to the performance of the financial 
instruments in which the insurance undertaking has invested or to which the customer’s benefits are 
linked. In view of this, depending on the nature of the guarantee, IBIPs could be regarded as non-
complex, even though the contract may provide investment exposure that is not limited to financial 
instruments deemed non-complex under MiFID II. In this case, EIOPA considered that as a minimum 
the customer should be guaranteed to receive, at both surrender and maturity, at least the amount 
of the premiums that they have paid, minus legitimate costs levied.  
In accordance EIOPA issued the following technical advice: “An IBIP shall be considered as 
non-complex for the purposes of Article 30(3)(a)(ii) of Directive (EU) 2016/97 if it satisfies all of the 
following criteria: (a) the contractually guaranteed minimum surrender and maturity value is at least 
the amount of premiums paid by the customer minus legitimate costs levied. (b) it does not 
                                                          
18 However, in these cases it was still necessary to modify some of the MiFID II requirements to appropriately 
reflect the insurance sector. In particular, regarding the provision in point (d) of the technical advice, given that 
exit penalties have been a feature of long term insurance based investment products that are considered to 
have led to consumer detriment, this is intended to exclude products with unreasonable exit charges, including 
fiscal penalties 
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incorporate a clause, condition or trigger that allows the insurance undertaking to materially alter the 
nature, risk or pay-out profile of the IBIP; (c) there are options to surrender or otherwise realise the 
IBIP at a value that is available to the customer; (d) it does not include any explicit or implicit charges 
which have the effect that, even though there are technically options to surrender the IBIP, doing so 
may cause unreasonable detriment to the customer, because the charges are disproportionate to the 
cost to the insurance undertaking of the surrender; (e) it does not in any other way incorporate a 
structure which makes it difficult for the customer to understand the risks involved.” 
Contracts for IBIPs can be complicated and difficult to understand for consumers. Distributors, 
either insurance undertakings or insurance intermediaries, therefore play an important role in 
processing information for the consumer and guiding consumers in choosing suitable insurance 
policies. Prior to the advent of the IDD, consumer protection standards for the sales of insurance-
based investment products were not considered sufficient at EU level to reduce the risk of mis-selling 
of those products, as the IMD did not contain specific rules for the sale of life insurance products with 
an investment element. This was so in spite of the fact that these products are generally more 
complicated and represent higher risks for retail consumers than other insurance products. Hence, 
IDD stipulated additional conduct of business rules for the sale of IBIPs, and it provided for the case 
that a differentiation should exist between complex and non-complex IBIPs. Where an IBIP is 
considered non-complex, Member States may allow insurance distributors to not undertake some of 
the assessments (suitability and appropriateness) during the sales process that are normally necessary 
for the distribution of IBIPs. The EIOPA technical advice on the criteria to be used to assess “other non-
complex IBIPs” aimed to facilitate the identification of “other non-complex IBIPs”, such that only those 
products for which the risks are readily understood by customers, can be sold by execution-only. It 
also aimed to promote the consistent application of the IDD with respect to the identification of “other 
non-complex insurance-based investments” to be consistent with the line taken in the delegated acts 
expected to be adopted under Article 25(8) of MiFID II. Those aims are aligned with those under the 
IDD, i.e. the aim of improving insurance regulation in a manner that will facilitate market integration, 
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the aim of establishing the conditions necessary for fair competition between distributors of insurance 
products and the aim of strengthening consumer protection, in particular with regards to IBIPs. It 
follows that an overly strict approach would not only be disadvantageous for insurance undertakings 
and insurance intermediaries, but also for customers and potentially for NCAs. Hence, the adoption 
of criteria based on MiFID II seemed like the best solution in many respects, i.e. firstly because it was 
considered as striking the appropriate balance between the interests of insurance distributors and 
those of their customers and because it was considered as enabling the necessary flexibility at NCA 
level via the provision of criteria for other “non-complex insurance-based investments” at EU level. 
Not least, at customer level it seemed reasonable to prevent insurance undertakings and insurance 
intermediaries from making insurance products available for sale via execution-only which do not 
meet the criteria, while enabling customers to execute an order for products if the criteria are met.19 
 
5.  Comparison Between the Rules on Financial Products & Their Effect on IBIPs.  
 
The IDD ushers in a number of changes versus the IMD including additional requirements for 
IBIPs and the introduction of an Insurance Product Information Document (IPID) for non-life insurance 
products. In relation to cross-selling, if an ancillary product or service, which is not insurance based, is 
offered together with an insurance product, then the distributor must inform the customer about the 
components, costs, charges, and risks of each component. IDD also introduces product oversight and 
governance requirements similar to MiFID II for all insurance products (with an exemption for 
insurance of large risks). The approval process for each insurance product should be defined as 
proportionate to the nature of the insurance products that are about to be sold to customers. It should 
incorporate the identification of the target market, the risk assessment and assure that the 
distribution strategy is aligned with the identified market. Regular reviews must also be performed to 
                                                          
19 EIOPA, Technical Advice on possible delegated acts concerning the Insurance Distribution Directive, 1/2/2017, 
EIOPA-17/048, 
 https://eiopa.europa.eu/Publications/Consultations/EIOPA%20Technical%20Advice%20on%20the%20IDD.pdf  
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check that products remain effectively distributed and consistent with the objective of the respective 
target markets. This requires manufacturers to put at the distributors’ disposal all product-related 
information deemed necessary. Conflicts of interests' management will now be subject to higher 
standards, which will be further detailed in the delegated acts. Appropriate information must always 
be available to customers before the signing of the insurance contract. In relation to inducements, 
enhanced actions should be taken in order to prevent the negative effects of any inducements on  the 
quality of the relevant service to the customer and the insurance company’s or intermediary’s duty to 
act honestly, fairly and professionally in accordance with the best interests of their customers. To that 
end, the insurance distributor should develop, adopt and regularly review policies and procedures 
relating to conflicts of interest with the aim of avoiding any detrimental impact on the quality of the 
relevant service to the customer and of ensuring that the customer is adequately informed about fees, 
commissions or benefits. In relation to assessing the suitability and appropriateness of this is 
conducted by insurance companies that provide advice to customers on IBIPs so as to enable them to 
recommend to the customer or potential customer the IBIPs that are suitable for that person. Where 
a bundle of services or products is envisaged, the assessment must consider whether the overall 
bundled package is appropriate. 20 
Conflicts of Interest: Article 18 of MiFID requires firms to take all reasonable steps to identify 
conflicts of interest both between themselves and their clients and among their clients. Article 13 of 
MiFID requires firms to maintain and operate effective organisational and administrative 
arrangements with a view to taking steps in order to prevent conflicts of interest from having an 
adverse effect on client interests. Where these arrangements cannot ensure with reasonable 
confidence that the risk of damage to client interests will be prevented, the firms must clearly disclose 
the conflicts to the clients. The MiFID delegated directive 2006/73/EC sets out in article 21 relevant 
                                                          
20 Deloitte, IDD: The MiFID of Insurance, 2016 
 https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/gr/Documents/financial-
services/gr_insurance%20distribution%20directive_noexp.pdf  
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factors for assessing whether a conflict of interest is detrimental to the client. These are: whether the 
firm is likely to make a financial gain or avoid a financial loss, at the expense of the client; whether the 
firm has an interest in the outcome of a service which is distinct from the client’s interest in that 
outcome; whether the firm has a financial or other incentive to favour the interest of another client 
or group of clients over the interests of the client; whether the firm carries on the same business as 
the client; and whether the firm or that person receives or will receive from a person other than the 
client an inducement in relation to a service provided. Article 22 of the MiFID delegated directive 
states that firms’ conflicts of interest policy must be set out in writing and be appropriate to the size 
and organisation of the firm and the nature, scale and complexity of its business. The conflicts of 
interest policy must: identify the circumstances which constitute or may give rise to a conflict of 
interest entailing a material risk of damage to the interests of one or more clients; and specify 
procedures to be followed and measures to be adopted in order to manage such conflicts. 
MiFID II imposes more onerous obligations on firms to manage conflicts of interest. The 
changes introduced by article 23 of MiFID II are: a new requirement to take all appropriate steps, 
which is more onerous than the current requirement to take reasonable steps in order to identify 
conflicts of interest; a new requirement to put systems and controls in place to prevent as well as 
manage conflicts of interest that cannot be prevented; and  where organisational arrangements are 
not sufficient to prevent conflicts from adversely affecting client interests, a new requirement to make 
an enhanced disclosure of the conflict and the steps taken to mitigate the risks before undertaking 
any business on the client’s behalf. The disclosure must be in a durable medium and include sufficient 
detail to enable the client to make an informed decision with respect to the service in the context of 
which the conflict arises. Disclosure may only be used as a way of managing conflicts of interest as a 
measure of last resort. Where a firm relies on disclosure, it is required to state expressly that the 
organisational and administrative arrangements established by the firm to prevent or manage 
conflicts are not sufficient to ensure, with reasonable confidence, that the risks of damage to the 
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interests of the client will be prevented. A firm is also required to assess and periodically review (at 
least annually) its conflicts of interest policy. 
Inducements: A firm must act honestly, fairly and professionally in accordance with a client’s 
best interests (article 19 of MiFID). Article 26 of MiFID delegated directive 2006/73/EC expands this in 
relation to inducements. Firms are not regarded as acting honestly, fairly and professionally in 
accordance with clients’ best interests if they pay or are paid a fee, commission or non-monetary 
benefit for providing investment or ancillary services to clients in exchange for investment or ancillary 
services, unless they can rely on an exemption. The exemptions are:  fees/commissions/non-monetary 
benefits paid or provided to or by the client; fees/commissions/non-monetary benefits paid or 
provided to or by a third party where: - prior to the provision of the service the nature and amount of 
the fee/benefit is disclosed to the client in an understandable manner (where the amount cannot be 
ascertained, the method of calculating that amount, must be clearly disclosed to the client); - the 
fee/benefit is designed to enhance the quality of the relevant service to the client and; - the 
fee/benefit does not impair the firm’s compliance with its duty to act in the client’s best interests; fees 
necessary for the provision of investment services e.g. custody costs and legal fees. 
MiFID II revises the rules around inducements indicating that the original provisions did not 
deal with inducements in a satisfactory fashion. The updated MiFID introduces an innovative way of 
addressing them that aims to embolden the provisioned requirements.  Hence, inducements in the 
context of investment advice on an independent basis and portfolio management are completely 
banned. The inducements rules regime in articles 24(7) – 24(9) of MiFID II provide that the current 
MiFID regime applies for all MiFID II firms but stricter rules apply to independent advisers and portfolio 
managers. Firms that provide independent advice to clients and/or portfolio management may not 
accept fees, commissions, monetary benefits and non-monetary benefits by any third party in relation 
to the provision of services to clients. Regarding minor non-monetary benefits, their acceptance is 
allowed, provided that:  the benefits are capable of enhancing the quality of the service provided; the 
benefits are of a scale and nature such that they could not impair compliance with the firm’s duty to 
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act honestly, fairly and professionally in accordance with the clients’ best interest;  the nature and 
amount of any benefit is clearly disclosed to the client; and the client is informed about mechanisms 
for transferring the fee/ commission/monetary benefit/non-monetary benefit received. Article 24(9) 
of MiFID II states that any payment or benefit which is necessary for or enables the provision of 
investment services cannot give rise to conflicts with the firm’s duty to act honestly, fairly and 
professionally in accordance with the client’s best interest. Such payments or benefits include custody 
costs, settlement and exchange fees, regulatory levies or legal fees. Firms are also  required to keep 
records to show that any fees, commissions or non-monetary benefits paid or received by the firm are 
designed to enhance the quality of the relevant service to the client. In addition, firms that provide 
independent advice to clients and/or portfolio management must set up and implement a policy to 
ensure that any fees, commissions or any monetary benefits paid or provided by any third party are 
allocated and transferred to each individual client.21  In short, MiFID II distinguishes between the rules 
that apply to investment services of investment advice on an independent basis and portfolio 
management and all other, non-independent investment services. Certain criteria need be satisfied to 
determine ‘independence’. The ESMA maintained that the proposals in this area will increase investor 
protection by specifying the requirements for advice to be considered ‘independent’. These proposals 
aimed at better distinguishing different types of advice provided to make it easier for clients to 
understand the nature and basis of investment provided to them and a selection process that fosters 
a fair and appropriate comparison of different financial instruments is without any doubt beneficial 
for investors. ESMA also elaborated on the essence of ‘sufficiently diverse financial instruments 
available on the market’ in its Technical advice. The reason for placing emphasis on this diversification 
of MiFID II hinges on the premise that it is closely intertwined with the new regime on inducements 
and it is critical to focus on the substance of this issue and pave the way for delineating the new 
                                                          
21 Pinsent Masons, Conflicts of interest and inducements, 21/10/2016 
 https://www.pinsentmasons.com/PDF/2016/Mifid%20II/MiFID-II-Conflicts-of-interest.pdf  
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inducements regulatory framework. MiFID II seeks to buttress the previous regime under MiFID with 
regards to the requirements for third party payments and benefits.22 
IBIPs under IDD and MiFID II: MiFID II defines an IBIP as “an insurance product which offers a 
maturity or surrender value and where that maturity or surrender value is wholly or partially exposed, 
directly or indirectly, to market fluctuations”. This indicates that an IBIP would need to include an 
investment component that is expected to provide a variable rate of return. In addition to the non-
life insurance products listed in Annex I to Directive 2009/138/EC (Solvency II), MiFID II excludes the 
following from the definition of an IBIP: life insurance contracts where the benefits under the contract 
are payable only on death or in respect of incapacity due to injury, sickness or infirmity; pension 
products which, under national law, are recognised as having the primary purpose of providing the 
investor with an income in retirement, and which entitles the investor to certain benefits; officially 
recognised occupational pension schemes falling under the scope of Occupational Pension Funds 
Directive 2003/41/EC or the Solvency II; individual pension products for which a financial contribution 
from the employer is required by national law and where the employer or the employee has no choice 
as to the pension product or provider. These exclusions result in a small selection of products, for 
example, unit-linked policies, with-profits policies and investment-linked income annuities (which are 
not considered pension products) that must comply with the IDD additional consumer protection 
requirements and, as confirmed by Recital 42 of the IDD, provide information in the form of a KID too. 
Article 26 IDD makes clear that Chapter VI requirements which apply only to IBI are additional to the 
requirements set out in Article 17, 18, 19 and 20 which apply to all products within scope of the IDD. 
Broadly, the additional IDD requirements on IBI products are as follows: Article 27 (Prevention of 
conflicts of interest); Article 28  ( Conflicts of interest); Article 29 ( Information to customers); Article 
30 ( Assessment of suitability and appropriateness and reporting to customers). Under Article 27 IDD, 
an insurance intermediary or an undertaking carrying on distribution of IBI products is expected to 
                                                          
22  G. Papaconstantinou, Investment Bankers in Conflict: The Regime of Inducements in MiFID II and the Member 
States’ Struggle for Fairness, ERCL 2016; 12(4): 356–390, 367. 
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maintain and operate effective organisational and administrative arrangements with a view to taking 
all reasonable steps to prevent a conflict of interests, which as determined under Article 28 IDD, could 
adversely affect the interests of customers. The wording in Article 27 is purposefully vague because 
the IDD, like the IMD, is a minimum harmonisation instrument. This means that the details as to what 
'effective organisational and administrative arrangements' are necessary will be determined by the 
national competent authorities.23  
 
6. The response of ESMA on the draft regulatory technical standards (RTS)  
 
The KID for PRIIPs was introduced by the PRIIPs Regulation. The explanatory memorandum to 
the proposal of the European Commission outlined the intention to improve the comparability and 
comprehensibility of information being provided to retail investors in the EU, as an important step to 
improve the protection of retail investors, to aid those investors in comparing between different 
PRIIPs, and to support the European single market.  The PRIIPs Regulation set out a number of features 
of the KID but left details of this information and its presentation to regulatory technical standards 
(RTS). The ESAs have been working since 2014 on finalising proposals for these RTS. The draft RTS have 
been prepared to offer a sound basis for comparing and understanding a wide range of PRIIPs.  
On March 31st, 2016 ESMA issued the final draft regulatory technical standards (“RTS”) with 
regards to presentation, content, review and provision of the key information document, including 
the methodologies underpinning the risk, reward and costs information in accordance within PRIIPs. 
The draft RTS relate to three Articles under the PRIIPs Regulation, i.e. the presentation and 
content of the Key Information Document (KID), including methodologies for the calculation and 
presentation of risks, rewards and costs within the document, under Article 8 (5); the review, revision, 
                                                          
23 Clifford Chance, MiFID II & IDD: The impact on insurance based investment ("IBI") products, 1/6/2016, 
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22 
 
and republication of KIDs, under Article 10 (2); andthe conditions for fulfilling the requirement to 
provide the KID in good time, under Article 13 (5). The draft RTS text and accompanying Annexes set 
out proposals in these areas. They reflect the responses to a final Consultation Paper 
(JC/CP/2015/073) published on the 11 November 2015, which itself followed a general Discussion 
Paper (JC/DP/2014/02) published on 17 November 2014, and a Technical Discussion Paper 
(JC/DP/2015/01) published on 23 June 2015.  The draft RTS combine the measures related to Article 
8 (5), Article 10 (2) and Article 13 (5). The draft RTS under Article 8 (5) specify the presentation and 
content of the KID and apply on the PRIIP manufacturer when drawing up a KID. They address the 
different sections of the KID set out in Article 8 (3), and the underlying methodologies necessary for 
obtaining and calculating information to be included in the KID, for instance in relation to risks, 
rewards and costs.  It includes a mandatory template to be used, including certain mandatory texts. 
The template includes details of the layout that must be followed. Whereas, for the risk and reward 
section of the KID, the draft RTS requires a summary risk indicator (SRI) that comprises seven classes, 
the format of which is to follow the template contained in the RTS.24 The draft RTS also contains a 
methodology for the assignment of each PRIIP to one of the seven classes in the SRI, and for the 
inclusion of narrative explanations, and for certain PRIIPs, additional warnings. The draft RTS includes 
requirements on performance scenarios and a format that must be followed for the presentation of 
these scenarios. These are to be presented in tables, showing possible performance for different time 
periods and at least three scenarios. There are also requirements on the calculation of the figures to 
be included. The draft RTS also cover requirements on the presentation of costs, including the figures 
that must be calculated and the format to be used for these. Detailed methods are included for the 
measurements and calculations needed for completing the prescribed format for each PRIIP. The cost 
                                                          
24 ESMA, Final draft regulatory technical standards, JC 2016,21 
 https://www.esma.europa.eu/sites/default/files/library/jc_2016_21_final_draft_rts_priips_kid_report.pdf   
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figures include a presentation of the accumulation of the costs in monetary and percentage terms for 
standardized period(s), and a breakdown of these costs in percentage terms.25 
For PRIIPs that offer multiple investment options to the retail investor, the draft RTS set out 
two approaches that the PRIIP manufacturers may follow:  
• Separate KIDs are produced for each option, containing information about both the PRIIP in 
general and about the option in particular; 
• The information that would normally be in a single stand-alone KID is separated. A generic 
KID is produced for the PRIIP in general, and specific information is provided in a separate document 
or documents about the details of the options (including on their investment objectives, their risks 
and rewards, and their specific costs). 
The draft RTS for Article 10 sets out requirements on the PRIIP manufacturer for the revision 
and republication of the KID at least each year, and an obligation to conduct ad hoc revisions, when 
necessary. The draft RTS for Article 13 sets out requirements on the person selling or advising on the 
PRIIP for the KID to be provided sufficiently early for a retail investor to be able to take its contents 
into account when making an investment decision.  
On 10 November 2016, the Commission issued a response notifying its Intention to amend 
the draft Regulatory Technical Standards. The Commission endorsed the draft RTS on 30 June 2016 by 
adopting the Commission Delegated Regulation of 30 June 201626. The Council approved them but 
the European Parliament had rejected them on 14 September 2016, calling for the following 
modifications: a) Multi-option PRIIPs: the treatment of multi-option PRIIPs should be clarified, in 
particular in relation to the explicit exemption granted to certain collective investment undertakings 
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 https://www.esma.europa.eu/sites/default/files/library/jc_2016_21_final_draft_rts_priips_kid_report.pdf  
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under the PRIIPs Regulation; b) a 4th performance scenario: the methodology for the calculation of 
future performance scenarios should reflect that retail investors may also lose money in an adverse 
scenario concerning certain PRIIPs, or in relation to certain products that have regularly led to losses 
over the recommended minimum holding period; c) a comprehension alert: detailed guidance should 
be provided regarding the use of the ‘comprehension alert’ in order to prevent inconsistent 
implementation of this element of the KID across the single market. More specifically, the European 
Commission, carefully assessed the choices jointly made by the three European Supervisory 
Authorities to allow comparability across different PRIIPs and concluded that the draft RTS marked a 
significant improvement in terms of transparency of those types of financial products. However, the 
Commission felt that, to effectively address the concerns expressed by the European Parliament, the 
following amendments to the Commission Delegated Regulation should be envisaged:  
Multi-option PRIIPs: to take account of the specific nature of multi-option PRIIPs offering, as 
underlying investment, a range of undertakings for collective investments in transferable securities 
(UCITS) and other non-UCITS funds that are marketed to retail investors under national law, the 
Commission proposes to allow manufacturers of such multi-option PRIIPs to use the UCITS information 
document as an appropriate means of providing retail investors with more detailed pre-contractual 
information. The proposed amendment should apply in accordance with the transitional period in the 
PRIIPs Regulation for UCITS and non-UCITS funds;  
Fourth performance scenario: the Commission proposes the following amendments to clarify 
the conditions that trigger the inclusion of a fourth performance scenario in Annex IV to the 
Commission Delegated Regulation, and to make some consequential adjustments to the existing 
performance scenarios. In particular, to reflect a more prudent approach, the mean of historical 
returns should be replaced with zero. The objective is to avoid that assumptions are made on the 
direction of the future market expectation over the holding period in the neutral scenario. An 
additional scenario should be included — a fourth scenario that may be renamed as 'stress scenario'— 
showing how the PRIIP performs under stressed market conditions. The stress scenario should be 
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mandatory as it is meant to complement the three 'normal' scenarios giving information on the 
possible outcome of the PRIIP where extreme market conditions materialise, given the assumptions 
made. The stress scenario should be identified through a stress-test analysis of the historical volatility 
over a pre-deemed short-term period, which should determine: i) the length of the windows of 
historical returns to be considered to generate the distribution of volatility; ii) the percentile of the 
distribution of volatility that identifies the stressed volatility; iii) the percentile of the distribution of 
returns that identifies the stress scenario. 
Comprehension alert: the Commission proposes to provide criteria in the Commission 
Delegated Regulation to facilitate a consistent use of the comprehension alert in the KID. Based on 
Recital 18 of the PRIIPs Regulation, the criteria should be the following: a) the PRIIP invests in 
underlying assets that are not commonly invested in by retail investors; b) the PIRIP uses a number of 
different mechanisms to calculate the final return of the investment, creating a greater risk of 
misunderstanding on the part of the retail investor; c) the investment’s pay-off takes advantage of 
retail investor’s behavioural biases, such as a teaser rate followed by a much higher floating 
conditional rate, or an iterative formula. 
Outcomes of the PRIIPs consumer testing, as undertaken by the Commission, suggested that 
simple disclosure approaches are associated with better comprehension of the KID. The presentation 
of administrative costs in relation to biometric components of insurance-based investment products 
in the KID does not currently serve this purpose. The Commission therefore proposed to reduce this 
complexity ensuring at the same time the same level of retail investor protection through the 
following amendments: a) in "What are the cost" section, to amend the presentation of "Ongoing 
costs" by deleting "Insurance costs" and bundling them into the "Other ongoing costs"; and b) in 
"What is this product" section, to locate all the information on insurance benefits and costs. The 
Commission invited ESAs to submit amended RTS within the six weeks27. The ESAs discussed the 
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amendments to the draft RTS received from the European Commission, but there were differing views 
expressed, concerning – in particular –  the treatment of multi-option products, the criteria to 
determine whether a comprehension alert should be included in a KID, and the provisions in the RTS 
on the credit risk mitigation factors for insurers. Concerns were also raised regarding the credibility of 
the ‘moderate’ scenario if it is either zero or - once costs are taken into account - if there is an 
indication of wan expectation of losses over the whole recommended holding period. Though 
discussions within the ESAs showed that there was recognition that there are pros and cons to this 
approach also, the methodology in the ESAs’ original draft RTS was still considered to be preferable. 
However, ESA stated that If the Commission nevertheless should wish to amend the RTS along the 
lines it has proposed, one option the ESAs considered was the use of the mean of the distribution of 
risk free returns, adjusted for dividend yields. It was also considered important for alternative 
approaches to be investigated as part of the review process.28 On the expiry of the stipulated by the 
Commission six week period, the ESAs did not adopt the final Opinion.  
 
7. The FCA Consultation on the IDD implementation 
 
The First Consultation Paper: the IDD covers the initial authorisation, passporting 
arrangements and ongoing regulatory requirements for insurance and reinsurance intermediaries. 
However, it also covers wider aspects, including organisational and conduct of business requirements 
for insurance and reinsurance undertakings. The IDD also introduces requirements in new areas. These 
include product oversight and governance, and enhanced conduct rules for insurance based 
investment products, where its stated intention is to more closely align the customer protections with 
                                                          
https://esas-joint-
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28 EOPA, EBA, ESMA, ESAs’ response to the intention of the European Commission to amend the draft 
Regulatory Technical Standards (RTS) jointly submitted by EBA, ESMA and EIOPA under Articles 8(5), 10(2) and 
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those provided by MiFID II. In March 2017, the FCA issued the first of two consultation papers, i.e. 
CP17/7 “Insurance Distribution Directive Implementation – Consultation Paper I”29 setting out its 
proposals for implementing the IDD. Consultation paper CP17/7 covers the FCA’s proposals for the 
following areas: a) application of the Directive, b) professional and organisational requirements, c) 
complaints handling and out-of-court redress, d) changes to conduct of business rules (for non-
investment insurance contracts) and e) the regulatory regime for ancillary insurance intermediaries. 
By issuing the first of two consultation papers, i.e. CP17/7 “Insurance Distribution Directive 
Implementation – Consultation Paper I” 30 the FCA has provided some useful clarity on its 
implementation proposals for the IDD in the UK.  
The FCA’s CP17/7 “Insurance Distribution Directive Implementation – Consultation Paper I”31 
follows the February 2017  “HM Treasury’s  consultation on the implementation of the IDD”32 
whereby the Treasury plans have confirmed the UK Government’s intention that the IDD will be 
transposed into UK law despite the country moving towards an exit from EU membership.33 As stated 
before, the IDD being a minimum harmonising directive, the UK government has the option of making 
its provisions more restrictive, i.e. by 'gold-plating' the legislation, as appropriate for the UK market. 
This has already occurred for the IMD, which the IDD updates, however the consultation invited 
comments from respondents on the appropriateness of continuing to do so for the IDD. In its 
proposals for IDD transposition, the Treasury stated that it had considered whether to exempt the so-
called 'introducers' from new UK rules. However, it had decided against the idea of doing so, as 
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 https://www.fca.org.uk/publication/consultation/cp17-07.pdf  
30 FCA, Insurance Distribution Directive Implementation – Consultation Paper I, CP17/7, March 2017, 
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31 FCA, Insurance Distribution Directive Implementation – Consultation Paper I, CP17/7, March 2017, 
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32 HM Treasury, Consultation: Transposition of the IDD, Feb. 2017, 
https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/transposition-of-the-insurance-distribution-
directive/transposition-of-the-insurance-distribution-directive   
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introducers carry out activities that go beyond the mere provision of information. The IDD, amongst 
other things, sets detailed requirements about the information that insurance distributors must 
disclose to customers before the conclusion of an insurance contract. Under the EU framework 
businesses that merely provide information about insurance products or an insurance intermediary 
or insurer to potential policyholders are exempt from the IDD regime so long as they do not take any 
additional steps to assist the customer in concluding an insurance contract. However, the Treasury 
had substantive  concerns that stopped it from broadening the information-only exemption to account 
for introducers, including that such a move might spur cold calling to customers. It expressed the 
following opinion, depicting the UK Government’s position, i.e. that although there had not been so 
far any evidence of consumer detriment where the only activity was the provision of information, 
nevertheless, it was believed that there was sufficient evidence that some firms acting as introducers 
might not just provide information but also actively seek to persuade customers.34 Hence, it was 
believed that in an effort to afford the maximum consumer protection, such an exemption should not 
apply and proposed the amendment of the FSMA (Regulated Activities) Order 2001 so that 
arrangements which would involve only the provision of information would effectively be out of the 
scope of regulation, in accordance with the language used in the IDD. The consultation paper, also 
confirmed that it intends for businesses that sell life and liability products as add-ons to a non-
insurance product to be subject to the IDD regime.35  
Coming back to the FCA’s CP17/7 “Insurance Distribution Directive Implementation – 
Consultation Paper I”36, the proposed policy changes have been developed in the context of the UK’s 
current regulatory framework within the EU and the FCA has stated that it will keep these policy 
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changes under review pending completion of negotiations for the UK’s exit from the EU. It is believed 
that the FCA and government consultations will move in tandem to ensure a streamlined 
implementation process and to ensure firms' readiness for the deadline date of 23 February 2018, the 
date by which EU member states must have transposed and implemented all of the provisions into 
national law. The consultation covers topics including how the IDD will generally apply to the UK 
regulatory system, professional and organisational requirements for insurance distributors, changes 
to conduct of business rules for non-life insurance products, and the regulatory regime for ancillary 
insurance intermediaries. The FCA proposes to keep any existing UK provisions that are already in 
place and that, in some cases, go beyond the IDD requirements. Where the IDD goes beyond existing 
UK provisions, the FCA proposes to copy most of the new provisions into its handbook.  This 
clarification of how the FCA proposes to approach implementation of the IDD serves as a positive sign 
and confirmation that the IDD will not represent a major overhaul of the existing distribution 
regime. Unlike with the IMD, the FCA does not appear to be planning extensive additions to the 
regulations, opting instead for a minimum harmonisation approach, although where existing rules go 
further than IDD minimums they will remain unchanged.  It should be noted, however, that the FCA 
has identified areas where its rules and guidance will need to be changed to give effect to the IDD. In 
some cases these proposed changes will simply codify specific provisions, but notwithstanding those 
case, the FCA is also proposing changes that will apply its requirements to all participants in the 
distribution chain, not just customer-facing distributors. In addition to changes which enhance familiar 
concepts such as the promotion of customer interests and pre-contract clarity, the consultation paper 
proposes some new specific obligations, in respect of commission disclosure, training requirements 
and cross-selling, that it considers are required to bring its rules in line with the new EU standard.37  
                                                          
37 FCA, Insurance Distribution Directive Implementation – Consultation Paper I, CP17/7, March 2017, 
 https://www.fca.org.uk/publication/consultation/cp17-07.pdf; Pinsent Masons, “'Introducers' should be 
subject to UK insurance distribution rules, says Treasury”, February 2017, https://www.out-
law.com/en/articles/2017/february/introducers-should-be-subject-to-uk-insurance-distribution-rules-says-
treasury/  
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The Second Consultation Paper and its effect on IBIP: When issuing the first consultation paper, 
CP17/7 “Insurance Distribution Directive Implementation – Consultation Paper I”38  the FCA 
announced that a second consultation would be published later in the year to cover conduct of 
business rules for life business and insurance-based investment products and product oversight and 
governance.  
The second consultation paper titled “CP17/23: Insurance Distribution Directive 
implementation – Consultation Paper II” was issued on 24/7/2017 and followed up from CP17/7 
with further proposals on how on changes to the rules for implementing the IDD requirements for life 
insurance business, including information provision requirements, and additional requirements 
related to the distribution of IBIPs, as well as covering changes to the rules to implement requirements 
in the IDD that apply to life and non-investment insurance business, including product oversight and 
governance, and professional and organisational requirements provisions.  The FCA asks for feedback 
to the consultation up until 20/10/2017. Upon closure of the said consultation on 20/10/2017, the 
FCA will publish feedback on responses and issue a Policy Statement s in December 2017. 39 
Changes to the FCA’s rules to implement the IDD requirements for life insurance business, 
including information provision requirements, and additional requirements related to the distribution 
of insurance-based investment products (IBIPs): 
a. firms’ general obligations (Chapter 4); 
b. information disclosure to customers (Chapter 5); 
c. inducements (Chapter 6); 
d. suitability (Chapter 7); and 
e. appropriateness (Chapter 8). 
                                                          
38 FCA, Insurance Distribution Directive Implementation – Consultation Paper I, CP17/7, March 2017, 
 https://www.fca.org.uk/publication/consultation/cp17-07.pdf  
39 P. Estlin, “FCA Consults Again on IDD Implementation”, LexisNexis Financial Services Blog,  
http://blogs.lexisnexis.co.uk/fs/fca-consults-again-on-idd-implementation/ 
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CP17/23, outlines the FCA’s approach to the rules on IBIPs. It is the FCA’s intention to align 
IBIPs and pensions to MiFID II standards because they are substitutable for MiFID II investment 
products and already subject to the COBS sourcebook, even though they are not subject to MiFID and 
will not be within scope of MiFID II. Accordingly, this intention supports the FCA’s view that a broadly 
consistent regulatory regime helps to maintain an appropriate level of protection for consumers and 
a consistent framework for firms. 
The main areas discussed in CP17/23 which would be affected by the application of MiFID II 
standards are: a) the information requirements: Article 29 of the IDD contains the information 
requirements for IBIPs customers, who must be provided with information on all costs and related 
charges of the investment product. As a minimum, the IDD expects firms to provide customers with a 
periodic assessment of the suitability of the recommended IBIP (if advice is provided), guidance on 
and warning of the risks associated with IBIPs and costs relating to distribution of the products, 
including the cost of the advice, where relevant. All of this information must be delivered to the 
customer in a comprehensible form and presented in a standardised format. Article 30(1) of the IDD 
sets out the rules for assessing the suitability and appropriateness and reporting to customers, and 
like Article 25(2) of MiFID II, the insurance intermediary or the insurer will be expected to obtain 
information from the customer on its ability to bear losses, investment objectives and risk tolerance 
to ensure that the recommended IBIP(s) is suitable for the customer, taking into account the 
customer’s risk tolerance and ability to bear losses; b) Inducements: Article 29(2) of the IDD requires 
an insurance intermediary or insurer to ensure that any payment of fees, commission or non-
monetary benefit in connection with the distribution of an IBIP product or ancillary service to or by a 
third party does not have a detrimental impact on the quality of the service to the customer and does 
not impair the insurance intermediary or insurance firm’s duty to act honestly, fairly and professionally 
in the best interests of its customers. Similarly, Article 24(7)(b) of MiFID II prohibits advisers from 
accepting and retaining fees, commissions or any monetary or non-monetary benefits from third 
parties unless such benefits are ‘minor non-monetary benefits’. The FCA intends to implement Article 
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29(2) in COBS 2.3A and highlight  the areas in which the IDD requirements differ from those in MiFID 
II or the current rules. 40  More specifically, The FCA proposes to apply the high level inducement rule 
in COBS 2.3A to firms doing insurance distribution activities in relation to IBIPS, and within that section 
include new requirements as necessary to implement the Article 29(2) requirement (and for this 
business COBS 2.3 will be disapplied); maintain the existing requirements in COBS 2.3 for other life 
policies without changes; and continue to apply the RDR rules in COBS 6. The FCA is also considering 
whether to ‘level up’ to MiFID II requirements. In some areas, the MiFID II delegated acts include 
additional detail compared to the IDD with regard to inducements41; c) suitability: The FCA proposes 
integrating the IDD requirements for suitability into the new COBS 9A for IBIPs. The current suitability 
requirements in COBS 9 will continue to apply to other life policies42; d) appropriateness: for non-
advised sales, insurance intermediaries or insurance firms will be expected to consider the customer’s 
experience and knowledge of investments to assess whether the IBIP is appropriate for them (Article 
30(2) of the IDD). Where the IBIP is not appropriate, the insurance intermediary or the insurance firm 
will have to warn the customer that this is the case. The same warning must be given where 
insufficient information of the customer’s knowledge and experience has been given. At present, the 
FCA’s rules on appropriateness (COBS 10) do not apply to life policies or IBIPs and it is proposed that 
they will feature in a new COBS 10A chapter solely applying to IBIPs.43  The associated record-keeping 
requirements, including a minimum retention period of five years, will be integrated into SYSC 9 for 
intermediaries and SYSC 3 for insurers in line with the FCA’s approach to suitability and MiFID II. The 
FCA proposes to exercise the derogation to allow non-complex IBIPs to be sold under the execution-
                                                          
40 P. Estlin, “FCA Consults Again on IDD Implementation”, LexisNexis Financial Services Blog,  
http://blogs.lexisnexis.co.uk/fs/fca-consults-again-on-idd-implementation/  
41 James Smethurst, George Swan, Chris Chapman and Priti Lancaster, Insurance bulletin: FCA publishes second 
Insurance Distribution Directive consultation paper, Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer LLP, 
https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=56984582-052e-4f62-9c5c-4c9c5783a17c  
42 James Smethurst, George Swan, Chris Chapman and Priti Lancaster, Insurance bulletin: FCA publishes second 
Insurance Distribution Directive consultation paper, Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer LLP, 
https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=56984582-052e-4f62-9c5c-4c9c5783a17c  
43 P. Estlin, “FCA Consults Again on IDD Implementation”, LexisNexis Financial Services Blog,  
http://blogs.lexisnexis.co.uk/fs/fca-consults-again-on-idd-implementation/  
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only process and integrate the IDD execution-only requirements into the new COBS 10A.44; e) 
conflicts of interest: The IDD has a set of provisions designed to stop conflicts of interests leading to 
consumer harm in the distribution of IBIPs. Articles 27 and 28 of the IDD focus on the need for effective 
organisational and administrative arrangements by insurance intermediaries and undertakings to 
avoid conflicts leading to consumer detriment in relation to IBIP distribution. The FCA proposes to 
maintain the current approach in its rules of applying conflict of interest requirements to distributors 
of all types of insurance (including all life and general insurance business) rather than limiting the 
application to IBIP business only. The IDD requirements are broadly consistent with existing rules in 
SYSC 10, so the FCA notes that the impact on firms should be low, while maintaining existing consumer 
protections; f) Product oversight and governance: the FCA proposes to introduce a new chapter to the 
PROD sourcebook to implement the provisions for insurance business. These new rules will replace 
broadly equivalent existing RPPD guidance for firms within scope of PROD. The product governance 
provisions will apply to all insurers and insurance intermediaries where those firms manufacture or 
distribute insurance products. This will include applying the requirements to all insurers, whether they 
distribute products directly or via intermediaries.45 
The FCA issued also a third Consultation paper titled  “CP17/33: Insurance Distribution 
Directive implementation – Consultation Paper 3” followed on from CP17/7 and CP17/23 with further 
proposals on how   to implement the IDD in the UK, covering changes to our rules to reflect the 
requirements of the IDD delegated acts, relating to inducements requirements for IBIPs (Chapter 4) 
suitability and appropriateness requirements for IBIPs (Chapter 5)disclosure requirements for IBIPs 
                                                          
44 James Smethurst, George Swan, Chris Chapman and Priti Lancaster, Insurance bulletin: FCA publishes second 
Insurance Distribution Directive consultation paper, Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer LLP, 
https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=56984582-052e-4f62-9c5c-4c9c5783a17c  
45 James Smethurst, George Swan, Chris Chapman and Priti Lancaster, Insurance bulletin: FCA publishes second 
Insurance Distribution Directive consultation paper, Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer LLP, 
https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=56984582-052e-4f62-9c5c-4c9c5783a17c  
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and mandatory occupational pensions (Chapter 6), inter alia. The FCA requests feedback by 
25/11/2017. CP17/33 should be read in conjunction with CP17/23.  
 
8. The FCA Policy Statement – PS 18/1: The Effect for English Law  
 
On January 19th, 2018 the FAC published Policy Statement PS 18/1 titled “Insurance Distribution 
Directive implementation – Feedback and near-final rules for CP17/23, CP17/32, CP17/33, CP17/39 
and near-final rules for CP17/07”46 as  a response, inter alia to the feedback received to Consultation 
Paper 17/33 (CP17/33). The FCA clarified that following publication on 15th January 2018 by the 
Treasury of the legislation that will allows the full transposition of the IDD47, they have on the one 
hand taken account of the statutory instrument but, as it was not yet finalised, could not publish their 
final rules in the PS18/1. However, the FCA notes that publishing near-final rules at this stage is 
beneficial as it gives firms more time to implement the changes they need to make for the IDD. The 
FCA plans to finalise the rules as soon as the legislation will be finalised and do not expect to make 
any changes to the near-final rules.  
PS18/1 is of interest to insurance and reinsurance companies, intermediaries, other firms and 
customers in the insurance market, and bodies representing these groups, as well as designated 
professional bodies and their members, not least customers who have a clear interest in financial 
markets that operate fairly and transparently, including the way in which firms implement the new 
requirements of the IDD.48 On 20 December 2017, the European Commission (the Commission) 
proposed delaying the application date of the IDD to 1 October 2018. The Commission is also preparing 
to postpone the application of two delegated regulations adopted under the IDD. Under this proposal, 
firms would have until 1 October 2018 to implement the new IDD requirements, hence may be able 
                                                          
46 https://www.fca.org.uk/publication/policy/ps-18-1.pdf  
47The Treasury, Transposition of the Insurance Distribution Directive, 15 January 2018: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/transposition-of-the-insurance-distribution-directive   
48 Such as, e.g. the rules about conduct of business and information disclosure. 
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to comply with the IDD early. In view of the above, the FCA have included a formal transition period 
in their near-final rules to clarify that firms may adopt some, or all of the new IDD requirements early 
if they so choose. This transitional provision requires firms to have regard to whether the new 
requirements are similar in purpose to the current FCA rules, and provide consumer protection similar 
to, or greater than, the current FCA rules as well as requiring firms to keep a clear record of their 
decision to comply early, including whether this relates only to a specific requirement or all IDD 
requirements.49 The FCA received 45 responses to CP17/33, most of which supported their proposals 
or asked for further guidance and, in general, decided to implement the consultation proposals with 
only minor changes.  
In relation to the feedback received with regards to the FCA’s proposed approach to the 
inducements requirements of the IDD, including those in the IBIP regulation50 the FCA received 
seventeen responses to its proposals.51 Most supported the FCA’s approach but two respondents 
disagreed with it, i.e. one disagreeing with the regulatory burden of disclosing broker earnings, the 
other providing no reason. Also, upon the end of the consultation the FCA received an email about 
the application of the rules for acceptable minor non-monetary benefits for retail clients and the 
position of professional clients. The FCA responded that they were making near-final rules in line with 
their proposed approach. They pointed out that in alignment with their previous indication in PS17/27 
whereby they were still considering whether it is possible for the rules for IBIPs (COBS 2.3A) to apply 
only the MiFID II-derived high-level requirement that inducements must enhance the quality of the 
                                                          
49 https://www.fca.org.uk/publication/policy/ps-18-1.pdf, p.5 
50 http://ec.europa.eu/finance/docs/level-2-measures/idd-delegated-regulation-2017-6229_en.pdf.  
6In CP17/33 the FCA had proposed to reproduce within COBS 2.3A the relevant provisions on inducements from 
the IBIP regulation, and to apply these requirements as rules for firms which are subject to our existing rules but 
not within scope of the IDD and to ‘translate’ some words and phrases used in the IBIP regulation into Glossary 
terms as part of a new COBS 1.3; to align the inducements rules for IBIPs with the MiFID II requirements in COBS 
2.3A where MiFID II includes relevant additional detail compared to the IDD, because of certain record-keeping 
obligations, because of sales involving more than one distributor firm and because EOF ongoing assessments 
that firms must make to ensure that inducements enhance the quality of services. But, the FCA proposed not to 
apply all of the COBS 2.3A record-keeping obligations to IBIPs, and instead to continue to rely on the high-level 
requirements within Chapters 3 and 9 of the Senior Management Arrangements, Systems and Controls 
sourcebook (SYSC). They also proposed a change to COBS  regarding minor non-monetary benefits and in order 
to make sure that this properly reflected the wording of the IDD inducements test for IBIPs, the FCA proposed 
to include a ‘detrimental impact’ test; https://www.fca.org.uk/publication/policy/ps-18-1.pdf, p.11. 
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service and also in light of clarifications from ongoing European transposition work in relation to the 
IDD, they had decided to apply this high-level requirement and moreover, in order to provide further 
detail to help firms meet the rule, they also proposed to reproduce some of the provisions from the 
IBIP Regulation. The FCA expectation is to be understood as entailing that firms meeting the MiFID II 
standard would also meet the IDD standard – in view of an effort for the provision of a single standard 
across business to which COBS 2.3A applied, including IDD and MiFID II business. However, they 
noticed the possibility of having at a later stage to take into account the  ongoing European 
transposition work in relation to the IDD Regarding minor non-monetary benefits, due to the 
differences in approach in MiFID II and the IDD. In other words, due to the fact that the MiFID 
businesses are  subject to greater restrictions the FCA decided to reflect this difference in their rules 
in light of the different protection needs for retail and professional clients and have therefore 
proposed a minor change to the rules to clarify the position as well as having made a minor change to 
allow firms to receive or make payments or benefits which enable or are necessary for the distribution 
of an IBIP (e.g. regulatory levies or legal fees) in alignment with existing rules and MiFID II. The FCA 
believe that these changes will not have any impact on costs and benefits and have strived to produce 
a set of amended rules aiming to ensure a similar degree of consumer protection as those on which 
they consulted, hence expect any changes overall to costs and benefits to be minimal.52 
In relation to the feedback received with regards to the FCA’s proposed approach to the 
suitability and appropriateness requirements of the IDD, including those in the IBIP regulation53 the 
FCA received seventeen responses to these proposals mostly supportive of their proposed approach 
but for five respondents who disagreed with the proposals and supported the view that the proposed 
rules didn’t clarify whether the requirement to conduct an appropriateness test applies where 
customers top-up existing policies or switch to a fund deemed complex within an existing product and 
also stated the view that the IDD requirements were not intended to be retrospective or to apply the 
                                                          
52 https://www.fca.org.uk/publication/policy/ps-18-1.pdf, p. 11-12 
53 http://ec.europa.eu/finance/docs/level-2-measures/idd-delegated-regulation-2017-6229_en.pdf.  
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appropriateness test to existing policies. Once again, the FCA responded that they were making near-
final rules in line with their proposed approach, including their approach to record-keeping standards 
and confirmed that the rules on the application of the appropriateness test were intended to apply to 
new contracts with effect from the IDD application date. The FCA added that fund switches and 
exercise of existing contractual options would not trigger such requirements as the application 
provisions would only apply the rules where a firm would be carrying out insurance distribution 
activities in relation to an IBIP. The FCA also retained the five-year minimum term for retention of 
records about suitability and appropriateness and the obligation to hold the records for at least the 
duration of the relationship between the firm and the customer, which may be longer than five years.54  
In relation to the information disclosure requirements, the FCA noted that several of their 
existing rules had not been neither replicated in the IDD nor in the IBIP regulation and hence the FCA 
maintained current levels of consumer protection where their rules contained additional obligations 
or greater detail than the IDD and hence had proposed in CP17/33 to introduce rules to make sure 
they continue to apply to life insurance distribution. Most of the seventeen responses they had 
received agreed with their proposals and although no respondents had disagreed, some had asked 
clarifications of the FCA’s expectations on a number of points such as whether the disclosures apply 
to top-ups, switches and other customer-exercised contractual options where a new contract results, 
whether the requirement to provide a single disclosure of costs and charges for the IBIP and advice 
would be helpful for customers; whether the annual cost disclosures required by the rules applied 
only where a firm would be providing ongoing insurance distribution activities; and whether the 
requirement to disclose ‘all costs and charges’ could be met by the provision of prescribed disclosure 
documents (the Key Features Documents and the Key Features illustrations, or the Packaged Retail 
and Insurance-based Investment Products (PRIIPs) Key Information Document (KID) together with 
disclosure of any cost of advice and/or arranging activities). The FCA responded that they were making 
near-final rules in line with their proposed approach. In relation to the clarifications sought  the FCA 
                                                          
54 https://www.fca.org.uk/publication/policy/ps-18-1.pdf, p. 13-14 
38 
 
responded that the requirements applied where a firm was carrying on ‘insurance distribution 
activities’ in the sense of the latter being a defined term covering activities such as advising on 
investments, and assisting in the administration and performance of a contract of insurance and that 
the firms will need to comply with the disclosure rules where they conducted these activities – 
including in relation to a customer topping up an existing contract, making a fund switch or exercising 
other contractual options. In relation to aggregated costs and charges the FCA responded that 
disclosure could benefit customers by allowing them to see the total charges for an IBIP, taking 
account of the cost of advice, and enable them to take an informed decision about whether to proceed 
and that firms would be obliged to provide an itemised breakdown of charges, if requested by a 
customer or could consider providing this breakdown proactively, if they determined it as important 
to the customer’s ability to understand the product and service. In addition, distributor firms had to 
provide customers with information about the firm’s charging structure before a personal 
recommendation would be provided, i.e. information on the cost of the advice service and the total 
charges for the recommended IBIP, taking account of the cost of advice. In relation to annual costs 
disclosures the FCA responded that those are only required where firms were carrying on insurance 
distribution activities but firms had to provide customers with periodic reports which would include 
information on product charges. If any costs and charges associated with the distribution of a life 
policy were not included in a KID (or if the KID were not to be required for a product) then firms would 
need to make separate disclosures. 
In relation to communicating a number of disclosures to customers ‘in good time’ before 
providing a service or before the conclusion of the contract, the FCA noted the received requests for 
more detailed guidance setting more specific expectations or good practice standards but was of the 
opinion that this would be inappropriate as any additional detail could reduce flexibility for firms and 
would go further than in other sectors, such as for MiFID II, which have the same guidance as we are 
introducing without including more detail. 
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Finally, in relation to information disclosure requirements for an insurance distributor when 
an employee becomes a member of a mandatory occupational pension arrangement, without having 
taken an individual decision to join it, as per article 22(5) of the IDD, the FCA decided not to include 
any additional rules to implement Article 22(5) as its scope was for it to operate as an exemption 
rather than as an additional requirement. The FCA pointed out that where pension arrangements 
caught by the IDD were within their rules, they were applying the relevant IDD requirements without 
this exemption.55 
 
9. Conclusions 
 
IBIPs are an important feature of insurance. However, it has not always been easy to make 
them widely known to the wider public due to the slow opening of the market for financial services 
within the EU. Notwithstanding the above remark, the further liberalization of the financial services 
sector in the EU is today more possible than before and the pace of this occurring process has been at 
times accelerated due to the introduction of Regulations of major importance, such as PRIIPs. PRIIPs 
is unique, inter alia, in that it introduces the KID.  
Currently, open ongoing discussions between various stakeholders (ESMA, ESAS, Commission) 
on the amendment of the RTS have resulted in different voices having been raised, in view of a better 
protection of the assured.  ESA has expressed the view that its methodology is fairer as well as the 
need to investigate a plethora of plurality of approaches.  
The awaited response from the Commission, has entailed the endorsement of the bundling - given the 
interconnectedness of the three RTS to ensure the full consistency of the requirements introduced.  
In the UK, following the first and second consultation papers of the FCA on the 
implementation of the IDD and the FCA policy statement PS18/1, it is concluded that the FCA 
responded in a way where it a) maintained its rules unchanged where better protection was offered  
                                                          
55 https://www.fca.org.uk/publication/policy/ps-18-1.pdf, pp. 14-17. 
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to customers rather than the one available under the IDD56; b) proposed alignment  with already 
existing high-level requirements under other legislation (e.g. MiFID II)57; c) clarified the extent of the 
use of rules of the IDD wherever needed58 and d) denied to introduce rules which would reduce market 
flexibility and surpass the ambit of the provisions of MiFID II, hence harming the customer in the first 
place59 or misinterpret the actual ambit of the use of any provision in MiFID II - such as in the case of 
information disclosure requirements for mandatory occupational pension arrangement of insurance 
employees where the scope of  Article 22(5) of IDD was for it to operate as an exemption rather than 
as an additional requirement.  
 
                                                          
56 Such as in the case of the information disclosure requirements, whereby the FCA noted that several of their 
existing rules had not been neither replicated in the IDD nor in the IBIP regulation and hence the FCA maintained 
current levels of consumer protection where their rules contained additional obligations or greater detail than 
the IDD and hence had proposed in CP17/33 to introduce rules to make sure they continue to apply to life 
insurance distribution. 
57 i.e. in relation to inducements 
58 In relation to its suitability and appropriateness requirements where this would be needed only in relation to 
new contracts and where a firm would be carrying out insurance distribution activities in relation to an IBIP. 
59 Such as e.g. in the case where entailing a number of extended disclosures where it felt that such a practice 
would overall could reduce flexibility and would go further than in MiFID II and  hence would detriment the 
customer. 
